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RESUMEN
Los accidentes en las plantas petroquímicas y refinerías 
son bastantes destructivos, debido a la gran reactivi-
dad de los productos químicos que están presentes en 
las mismas. Un accidente que ocurrió en la refinería de 
la ciudad de Texas, el 23 de marzo de 2005, consistente 
en la explosión de una nube de vapor (ENV), que se pro-
dujo tras la fuga de gasolina y causó 15 muertes ha sido 
estudiado en términos de vulnerabilidad de las personas 
a la sobrepresión y la radiación térmica. Con este objeti-
vo, se utilizaron varios modelos empíricos sencillos (TNT, 
TNO Multienergía y BST) para evaluar los efectos de la 
sobrepresión de la explosión. Además, para estudiar los 
efectos de la radiación térmica se utilizó un modelo que 
permitía calcular el daño causado por el calor irradiado 
por la explosión. Finalmente, se utilizó la metodología Pro-
bit para evaluar la vulnerabilidad de las personas. Aunque 
se observó diferencias en los resultados obtenidos por los 
modelos, todos ellos, los de sobrepresión y de radiación 
térmica,  reprodujeron con bastante exactitud los daños 
reales causados por la explosión en la refinería. Se puede 
decir que los modelos TNO y BST son los que con mayor 
precisión predijeron los efectos de sobrepresión causados 
por la explosión. Por tanto, la utilización de modelos empí-
ricos sencillos es factible para la evaluación de riesgos. 
Palabras claves:  Explosión de una nube de vapor (ENV); 
Análisis de consecuencias; Sobrepresión; Radiación tér-
mica; Refinería
SUMMARY
Accidents in petrochemical plants and oil refineries are 
quite destructive, due to the high reactivity of chemicals 
involved in them. An accident that occurred in the Texas 
City refinery, on March 23rd 2005, consisting on a vapour 
cloud explosion (VCE) that followed a gasoline release and 
caused 15 deaths, has been studied in terms of people 
vulnerability to overpressure and thermal radiation. With 
this aim, simple models (TNT, TNO Multi-Energy, BST) 
have been used in order to evaluate the effects of the ex-
plosion. Moreover, a thermal radiation model was used to 
estimate the damage caused by the heat released as con-
sequence of the explosion. Finally, the Probit methodology 
was used to evaluate the vulnerability of persons. Although 
differences between the data derived from each of them 
existed, they all reproduced actual damages with a rea-
sonable accuracy. The results reached let us say that the 
TNO and BST models predict with a reasonable accuracy 
the effects of the explosion that occurred. Furthermore, 
the use of simplified empirical models can be used for risk 
assessment.
Keywords: Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE); Consequence 
analysis; overpressure; thermal radiation; Refinery 
RESUM
Els accidents en les plantes petroquímiques i refineries 
són bastant destructius, degut a la gran reactivitat dels 
productes químics que són presents en elles. Un accident 
que succeí a la refineria de la ciutat de Texas, el 23 de 
març de 2005, consistent en l’explosió d’un núvol de vapor 
(ENV), que es va produir en haver-hi una fuita de gasolina i 
què causà 15 morts, s’estudia pel que fa a vulnerabilitat de 
les persones a la sobrepressió i a la radiació tèrmica. Amb 
aquest objectiu, s’utilitzen varis models empírics senzills 
(TNT, TNO Multienergia i BST) per avaluar els efectes de la 
sobrepressió de l’explosió. A més, per estudiar els efectes 
de la radiació tèrmica s’empra un model que permet cal-
cular el dany causat per la calor irradiada per l’explosió. 
Finalment, s’utilitza la metodologia Probit per avaluar la 
vulnerabilitat de les persones. Tot i que s’observen di-
ferències en els resultats obtinguts amb els diferents mo-
dels, tots ells, tant els de sobrepressió com els de radiació 
tèrmica,  reprodueixen amb força exactitud els danys reals 
causats per l’explosió en la refineria. Es pot dir que els 
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models TNO i BST són els que prediuen amb major preci-
sió els efectes de sobrepressió causats per l’explosió. Per 
tant, la utilització de models empírics senzills és factible 
per a la avaluació de riscos. 
Mots clau:  Explosió d’un núvol de vapor (ENV); Anàlisi de 
conseqüències; Sobrepressió; Radiació tèrmica; Refineria
INTRODUCTION
Petroleum has been the main energy source of the world 
in the latest 40 years as it can be seen in Figure 1 (http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/consumptionbriefs/cbecs/cbecs_
trends/figb8.gif). It has very important effects on the eco-
nomy of the countries due to the high fluctuation of crude 
oil prices and the fact that only a few countries posses 
oil reservoirs. It makes it very important the presence of 
a great number of refineries all over the world in order to 
make the most of crude oil.
Every year several fatal accidents occur in chemical 
plants. Because of their peculiar characteristics (volatile 
compounds, flammability, etc.), many of these accidents 
occur in refineries which are especially dangerous. This is 
due to the fact that they are vapour cloud explosions (VCE) 
or boiling liquid expanding vapor explosions (BLEVES). In 
addition, some domino effects can occur in this kind of ac-
cidents that could increase the damages and affect other 
zones (Delvosalle et al., 2002).
Recently, one of these accidents occurred in Texas City, 
Texas (USA) on March 23, 2005. This is an interesting case 
of study not only for being recent but also for its conse-
quences. In this accident 15 people died and important 
material damages occurred (BP fatal accident report).
Consequence analysis is used to estimate the magnitude 
of accident effects in human health, damages in facility/
equipment, economical losses or environmental impacts 
associated with accidents involving hazardous materials 
(toxic, flammable, explosive, radioactive, etc.). Conse-
quence analysis estimates releases to the environment, 
fire or explosions, and estimates the effects that a release 
might have on buildings, employees, or the public (Lobato 
et al., 2006).
Recently, Vapour Cloud Explosions (VCEs) can be analy-
sed by means of different models. Computational Fluids 
Dynamics (CFD) modelling techniques have been conside-
red for this purpose (Skalovonnos and Rigas, 2004; Tufa-
no et al., 1998). These models require a big mathematical 
effort and powerful equipment to be handled (Puttock at 
al., 2000). Furthermore, CFD model requires a few simpli-
fied assumptions and some adjustable parameters to be 
applied, because of the lack of fundamental knowledge 
on turbulent flows in unsteady, compressible and reacting 
media (Popot et at., 1996; Tufano et al., 1998).
There are several simplified models such as the TNT-
equivalent method, TNO multy-energy and the Baker-
Strehlow-Tang model (BST) collected in the literature, that 
have been used to model the effect of VCEs (Lobato et al., 
2006; Pierorazio et al., 2005; Rigas and Sklavounos, 2002; 
Shariff et al., 2006). Maybe, the best simulation of explo-
sions could be the combined use of simplified models, as 
an initial approach, with CFD methods.
In a consequence study of a VCE, the overpressure of the 
explosion must be related with different damages cau-
sed to both building and humans. Damage criteria can be 
taken from tables that relate overpressure with the Probit 
equation (Finney, 1971; CCPS, 2000).
In this work, the consequence analysis of an accident that 
occurred in the Texas City refinery, on 2005, consisting of 
a VCE that followed to a gasoline release, has been eva-
luated using three different simplified models to estimate 
the overpressure of the explosion and the Probit equation 
to estimate the vulnerability of persons. Moreover, a sim-
ple thermal radiation model has been used to estimate, in 
conjunction with Probit equation, the vulnerability corres-
ponding to the fire ball caused by the explosion.
2. THEORY
2.1. Evaluation of evaporated mass.
The evaluation of the quantity of evaporated mass is the 
most important parameter to be considered in this work. 
The complexity of the target liquid (gasoline) makes diffi-
cult its treatment, as it can be considered neither an over-
heated nor a boiling liquid.
The total leak amount, mT (kg), can be calculated by multi-
plying the discharge rate, QD (kg/s), by the leak time, tL(s), 
(Eq. (1)), both data are available in the fatal accident inves-
tigation report (BP fatal accident report). 
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This calculation provides the total mass present in the leak, 
a part of which suffers a flash distillation as a result of its 
pressure change. It has been considered that only the ga-
soline fractions with a distillation temperature lower than 
its storage temperature (374.25 K) can suffer this flash dis-
tillation. Using a typical ASTM distillation curve (Table 1), 
these fractions represent approximately, 17 % of the total 
mass. Consequently, the amount of gasoline, m0 (kg), that 
will suffer this flash distillation can be calculated by using 
the following equation (Eq. (2)).
    
(2)
Using this data, an energy balance can be applied to cal-
culate the mass of vapour cloud that produces the explo-
sion (Eq. (3)):
    (3)
where mv (kg) is the initial mass that contributes to the 
explosion, Cp (kJ/kg·K) is the heat capacity of the target 
liquid, To and Teb (K) represent respectively the initial and 
boiling temperatures of the liquid and hv (kJ/kg) is the heat 
of evaporation of gasoline.
The initial boiling point of the target gasoline (303 K) is qui-
te close to room temperature (300 K). For this reason, the 
amount of evaporated mass due to the liquid behaviour as 
a boiling liquid will be considered negligible. 
Table 1. ASTM distillation curve for a standard gasoline.
Distillate Volume (%) T (K)
Initial point 303.15
10 330.15
20 349.15
30 363.15
40 372.15
50 380.15
60 389.15
70 400.15
80 415.15
90 437.15
Final point 471.15
2.2. Evaluation of overpressure.
2.2.1. TNT Equivalency Explosion Model.
The TNT equivalency explosion model has been chosen 
because it is simple and tends to be better for estimating 
far-field damage. With this model, the overpressure deve-
loped at specified distances (points of interest) can be cal-
culated. In order to apply the TNT model to the estimation 
of the effects of a VCE, the fraction of total energy of the 
explosion used in the shock wave must be calculated first. 
Once the corresponding value is estimated, it is converted 
into the equivalent mass of TNT, WTNT (kg):
 
   (4)
where WTNT is the equivalent  mass of TNT (kg) that would 
produce the same effects as the explosion, η represents 
the explosion yield (dimensionless), it is generally accep-
ted that, taking as a basis for calculation the total quantity 
of vapor in the cloud, the value of η  is between 1% and 10 
% for most explosions. Wgas is the total mass of flammable 
gas in the cloud, ∆Hc(gas)  is the lower heat of combustion of 
the material (kJ/kg), and ∆Hc(TNT) is the heat of combustion 
of TNT (approximately 4680 kJ/kg).
Despite the limitations due to its simplified nature, the TNT 
model is still widely used to predict overpressures at a gi-
ven distance from the center of an explosion (Rigas and 
Sklavounos, 2002). This model is based on an empirical 
law, established from trials done using explosives. This law 
establishes equivalent effects for explosions occurring at 
the same normalized distance, expressed as:
    (5)
where z is the normalized or scaled distance (m/kg1/3), Rd 
is the real distance (m), and WTNT is the equivalent  mass of 
TNT (kg), calculated by equation 4.
For any given scaled distance, there is a corresponding 
value of overpressure, which is obtained from an empirical 
chart (see Figure 2) of scaled distance versus overpressu-
re. This graph is based on the results of numerous expe-
rimental programs involving high explosives (CCPS, 2000; 
Bodhurtha, 1980; Lees, 1980). Once this overpressure is 
obtained, the probability of suffering different damages 
can be calculated from the data reported in Table 2. Data 
presented in bold in this table are the damage thresholds 
used in the present work to carry out the study of the 
effects caused by the explosion. 
Figure 2. Overpressure vs. normalised 
distance for its use in TNT model.
Table 2. Different damages caused by the overpressure 
(Bodhurtha, 1980; Santamaría y Braña, 1998; Lobato et al., 
2006; Sariff et al., 2006). The data presented in bold repre-
sent the damage threshold selected in the present work.
Overpressure (KPa) Damage
0.204 Occasional breakage of large windows already under strain
0.275 Loud noise. Breakage of windows due to sound waves
0.681 Breakage of small panes of glass already under strain
2.04 20 % windows broken. Minor structural damage to houses
6.8 Partial demolition of houses, which become uninhabitable
13.6 Partial collapse of house roofs and walls
13.1-20.4 Destruction of cement walls of 20-30 cm width
16.2 1% of eardrum breakage
17 Destruction of 50 % of brickwork of houses. Distortion of steel frame building
20.4-27.7 Rupture of storage tanks
34-47.6 Almost total destruction of houses
47.7-54.4 Breakage of brick walls of 20-30 cm width
68.9
Probable total destruction of buildings. 
Machines weighing 3500 kg displaced and 
highly damaged
101 1% death due to lung haemorrhage
169.2 90% death due to lung haemorrhage
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2.2.2 TNO Multi-Energy Model
This model is increasingly accepted as a more reasonable 
alternative to be used as a simple and practical method 
(Bodhurtha, 1980; Díaz Alonso et al., 2006). It is based on 
the premise that a vapour cloud explosion can occur only 
within that portion of a flammable vapour that is partially 
confined. Thus, the amount of energy released during a 
VCE is limited either by the volume of the partially-confined 
portion of the flammable vapour cloud (if the flammable 
vapour cloud is larger than the partially-confined region) 
or by the volume of the vapour cloud (if the vapour cloud 
is smaller than the volume of the portion of the partially-
confined space). In both cases, the volume of the cloud 
within the partially-confined space can be converted into a 
hemisphere of equal volume. The model treats the hemis-
pherical cloud as a homogeneous, stoichiometric mixture 
of flammable gas and air, with a combustion energy of 3.1 
106 J/m3 (the average heat of combustion of a stoichiome-
tric mixture of hydrogen and air). TNO model has used a 
flux-corrected transport code to numerically simulate the 
explosion of a hemispherical, homogeneous, stoichiome-
tric cloud, with constant flame speed. TNO presents the 
results of this modelling as a family of curves in Figure 3 
(Mercx et al., 2000; Van der Berg, 1985). In this chart, ten 
curves that span the range of severities from mild deflagra-
tions to detonations have been shown. Each curve is as-
signed an integer that indicates its severity. Thus, curve #1 
means mild deflagration and #10 stands for detonation.
These curves correlate dimensionless overpressure (over-
pressure divided by atmospheric pressure) with combus-
tion energy scaled distance, which is calculated as fo-
llows:
    (6)
where  is the combustion energy scaled distance, di-
mensionless, Rd is the distance from the centre of the he-
misphere, m, P0 is the atmospheric pressure, J/m
3, and E 
is the total available energy, J.
With the equation 7 the peak side-on overpressure Ps (N/
m2), can be calculated
   (7)
where 
 
is the dimensionless peak overpressure, which 
can be calculated, once is known , from Figure 3.
2.2.3. Baker-Strehlow-Tang Model (BST)
This model has some similarities with the TNO Multi-Ener-
gy Model. Each model uses a family of curves to correlate 
 with , and both models use equation 6 to calculate. 
The method used to construct the graphical relationship 
between dimensionless and combustion energy scaled 
distance, , is different to that used in the TNO model. 
The curves used in the BST model, shown in Figure 4, 
are based on numerical modelling of constant velocity fla-
mes and accelerating flames spreading through spherical 
vapour clouds [10]. With this method, the strength of the 
blast wave is proportional to the maximum flame speed 
achieved within the cloud. Thus, each curve in Figure 4 
is marked with a flame velocity, which is presented in the 
form of a Mach number, Mf. In Table 3, the appropriate 
flame speed (Mach number) for the specific situation being 
modelled can be selected (Pierorazio et al., 2005; Baker et 
al., 1989). 
Table 3. Flame Speed in Mach Numbers (Mf) for igni-
tion sources used in the Baker-Strehlow-Tang Model.
Flame 
Expan-
sion
Fuel
Reactivity
Obstacle Density
Low Medium High
1 D
High 5.2 5.2 5.2
Medium 1.03 1.77 2.27
Low 0.294 1.03 2.27
2 D
High 0.59 1.03 1.77
Medium 0.47 0.66 1.6
Low 0.079 0.47 0.66
2.5 D
High 0.47 0.58 1.18
Medium 0.29 0.55 1.0
Low 0.053 0.35 0.50
3 D
High 0.36 0.153 0.588
Medium 0.11 0.44 0.50
Low 0.026 0.23 0.34
R
Ps
R
Ps
Figure 3. Normalised overpressure vs. normalised 
distance for its use in TNO Multi-Energy model.
Figure 4. Normalised overpressure vs. norma-
lised distance for its use in BST model.
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2.3. Thermal radiation caused by a fireball
Thermal radiation model caused by a fireball was used to 
estimate the damage caused by the explosion heat. In this 
work, the radiation flow on the affected surface has been 
calculated. Total evaporated mass, calculated somewhere 
else, is needed to apply this model. Once the total evapo-
rated mass is estimated, the flow of radiation per surface 
area and time unit, I (Jm-2s-1) was calculated using equa-
tions 8 to 10 (Santamaría and Braña, 1998):
    (8)
    (9)
    
(10)
where FR (dimensionless), is defined as the ratio between 
the energy emitted by radiation and the total energy re-
leased by the combustion. The FR values are in the range 
0.15 to 0.4, mv (kg) is the initial mass that contributes to 
the fireball, t (s) is the duration of the fireball, Dmax (m) is the 
maximum diameter of the ball. 
To calculate the  radiation flux over the affected surface 
IR (Jm
-2s-1) up to 100 m must be considered the geome-
tric view factor, Fvg and the transmissivity τ, defined as the 
fraction of energy transmitted and calculated approxima-
tely as follows:
    
(11)
where Pw (Pa), is the partial pressure of the water vapour 
and X (m) is the distance to the centre of the ball.
    
(12)
    
(13)
2.3.1. Thermal radiation vulnerability study 
Once the radiated energy caused by a fireball is calculated, 
an estimation of the vulnerability of persons can be calcu-
lated. In this work, Probit methodology has been used as a 
way of dealing with probabilities. The connection between 
Probit units (Y) and the percentage of affected population 
is given in Table 4 (Eisenberg and Lynch, 1975). Probit 
units are calculated as follows:
    
(14)
K1 and K2 are empirical constants and take respectively the 
values of -14.9 and 2.56 in the case of a fireball (Eisenberg 
and Lynch, 1975; www.mtas.es/insht/ntp/ntp_291.htm). V 
measures the intensity of the damage-causative factor. In 
the case of fireballs, V represents the thermal radiation re-
ceived, and it is calculated as follows:
    
(15)
3. Fatal Accident Scenario
The Texas City Refinery is BP’s largest and most complex 
oil refinery in the USA. It produces jet fuels, diesel fuels 
and chemical feed stocks. The refinery has a rated capa-
city of 460,000 barrels per day (bpd) and a production of 
up to 11 million gallons of gasoline per day (about 48.5 
millions litters). The BP Texas refinery is located at Texas 
City (Texas), it has 486 hectares and supplies 30 per cent 
of all the BP production in the United States and 3 per cent 
of all the production in that country. The BP Texas refinery 
has 30 process units. Among these units, the isomerisa-
tion plant (ISOM) is located, where the refinery converts 
low octane blending feeds into a higher octane feed that 
is included in the unleaded regular gasoline pool. The fa-
tal accident occurred in the unit mentioned above and at 
that time, approximately 800 additional staff were on site 
for turnaround work (BP fatal accident investigation report, 
2007).
On Wednesday, March 23rd of 2005, at 13:20h,  during the 
start-up of the Isomerisation Unit (ISOM), an explosion and 
fire occurred, killing fifteen and harmed over 170 people in 
the BP Products North America owned and operated by 
Texas City Refinery.
The temperature was 24.1ºC, barometric pressure 101,140 
Pa, humidity 35% and wind speed 1.5 m/s. The incident 
was an explosion in the west section of the complex, 
where the isomerisation plant (ISOM) was situated, and 
involved the F-20 unit (Figure 5). The flames reached 21 
metres height and people found explosion fragments at 8 
kilometres from the refinery. Figure 5 shows a scheme of 
the isomeration plant where the explosion occurred (BP fa-
tal accident investigation report, 2007). The raffinate split-
ter is a single fractionating column, 164 ft tall (50 metres) 
with 70 distillation stages. It has an approximate volume 
of 3,700 barrels, and processes up to 45,000 BP of raffi-
nate from the ARU. The blowdown system had to receive 
quench and dispose hot hydrocarbon vapours and minor 
associated liquids from the ISOM relief, vent, and pump-
out systems during upsets or shutdowns. The blowdown 
system consisted on the relief pipe work headers, the F-20 
unit and the Pump-Out Pump. Vapours dispersed from the 
top of the stack and liquids flew out of the drum through 
a gooseneck into the site’s closed sewer system.  F-20 is 
a vertical drum of 10-ft (3 metres) diameter with a 113-ft-
high stack (34.5 metres).
Probit % Probit % Probit % Probit % Probit %
0 0 3.92 14 4.42 28 5.10 54 5.92 82
2.67 1 3.96 15 4.45 29 5.15 56 5.99 84
2.95 2 4.01 16 4.48 30 5.20 58 6.08 86
3.12 3 4.05 17 4.53 32 5.25 60 6.18 88
3.25 4 4.08 18 4.59 34 5.31 62 6.28 90
3.35 5 4.12 19 4.64 36 5.36 64 6.41 92
3.45 6 4.16 20 4.69 38 5.41 66 6.48 93
3.52 7 4.19 21 4.75 40 5.47 68 6.55 94
3.59 8 4.23 22 4.80 42 5.52 70 6.64 95
3.66 9 4.26 23 4.85 44 5.58 72 6.75 96
3.72 10 4.29 24 4.90 46 5.64 74 6.88 97
3.77 11 4.33 25 4.95 48 5.71 76 7.05 98
3.82 12 4.36 26 5.00 50 5.77 78 7.33 99
3.87 13 4.39 27 5.05 52 5.84 80 8.09 99.9
Table 4. Probit units and percentages.
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In the ISOM unit, trailers were used as temporary offi-
ces. Several trailers involved in the incident were located 
between two operating units, the ISOM and the Naphta 
Desulphurisation Unit (NDU). The closest trailer (J.E. Merit 
trailer) was located at 150 ft (45.7 metres) from the base of 
F-20 and it was there where most of the fatalities occurred 
at the time of the explosion. In these trailers, fourteen out 
of the fifteen fatalities took place (BP fatal accident inves-
tigation report, 2007).
The gasoline flowed from the F-20 for 6 minutes, which 
resulted in a pool fire and a vapour cloud explosion. The 
ignition source that leaded to the explosion and following 
fire was probably a starting-up vehicle engine. The failure 
to institute liquid rundown from the tower, and the failure 
to take effective emergency action, resulted in the loss of 
containment that preceded the explosion. This was indi-
cative of the failure in following the established security 
policies and procedures.
Figure 5. Scheme of the Isomeration plant of 
the Refinery where the explosion occurred. Situ-
ation of different places. Not scale.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. Evaluation of evaporated mass.
As it has been previously described, the total mass in the 
leak can be calculated by multiplying the average dischar-
ge rate (220 kg/s) by the leak time (6 minutes). Using Eq. 
(1), the total leak mass equals 79,200 kg. 
Next, the application of Eq. (2) gives a fraction of the to-
tal mass equal to 13,644 kg. Finally, applying Eq. (3) and 
using typical Cp and hv values (Cp = 2,217 J·kg
-1K-1, hv = 3.5 
· 105 J·kg-1) the calculated evaporated mass is 4881.9 kg. 
This value will be used for both the calculation of the over-
pressure variation with distance and the effect of thermal 
radiation. 
Taking into account ARAMIS project (Delvosalle et al., 
2006) this amount of vapour cloud has a probability of 0.5 
of immediate ignition. Once this ignition is produced, (if it 
is considered as a fully developed VCE) its consequences 
are irreversible injuries or death outside the site. Conse-
quently, this result agrees with the real injuries in Texas 
fatal accident and with the rest of the results derived from 
the present work.
4.2. Effects of the explosion
Once it is known the amount of evaporated mass that ex-
plodes, simple models, as TNT, TNO and BST were used 
to estimate the damage caused by the overpressure of the 
explosion. Some standard damages caused by overpres-
sure are shown in Table 2. These values let us set represen-
tative limits of damage over the map of the plant. Results 
obtained with these simple models were compared with 
those supplied by BP in a public report of the accident.
In the case of TNT, different explosion yields were taken 
from 1% to 10 %, getting results of overpressure versus 
distance. As it is shown in Figure 6, results obtained for 
explosion yields equal to 10% reproduce reasonably well 
what really happened in the accident, where the  big ma-
jority of fatalities occurred in J.E. Merit Trailer, which was 
located at 45.7 m from the explosion and would suffer total 
demolition according to the model. TNO model was also 
used to calculate the overpressure at different distances. 
Results are shown in Figure 7 and predict more severe 
effects than the previous model, including 90 % lung hae-
morrhage in the people who were within the region whe-
re the trailer was located, apart from the total demolition 
of the trailer. Finally, BST model was used with the same 
purpose, considering a 3D flame expansion, high fuel 
reactivity and high obstacle density, leading to a value of 
M
w=0.588. Figure 8 shows the effect of the explosion using 
the BST model and that the calculated damages using the 
BST model were slightly more severe than those obtai-
ned with TNO. In any of the cases, and as commented 
above, this model also reproduces what happened in the 
accident. It is important to notice that, when talking about 
death, it is hard to simulate and get representative figures, 
due, mainly, to the domino effect that accompanies this 
sort of accidents. That is the reason why we talk in terms 
of building demolition and lung haemorrhage.
Predicted damages caused by overpressure vary with the 
applied model, increasing in the following order.
TNT<TNO<Baker-Strehlow
Plot Plan of Isomerization Unit
Aromatics Recovery Unit
ULTRACRACKER Site of Turnaround
(Not to Scale)
Avenue F Roadway
Flare Line from NDU to AU2
< 150 ft
Pipe R
ack
F-20
JE
 M
enitT
railer 
B
P Project M
eeting
Catalyst
Warehouse
C
ontech
I&
E
Jam
es 
T
im
ec
H
ahn
&
 
C
lay
Fluor
Q
A
/Q
C
T
railer
N
A
U
2
N
D
U
ISOM
Superior
ISO
M
 Satellite
C
ontrol R
oom
E-1101
F-1101
F-1102
ccc
B
-1
10
1
Avenue G Roadway
TankTank Tank Tank
5t
h 
St
re
et
Approx
C
ontech
I&
E
Jam
es 
T
im
ec
Pipe R
ack
JE
 M
enitT
railer 
B
P Project M
eeting
C
ontech
I&
E
Jam
es 
T
im
ec
H
ahn
&
 
C
lay
Fluor
Q
A
/Q
C
T
railer
A
U
2
N
D
U
Superior
ISO
M
 Satellite
C
ontrol R
oom
B
-1
10
1
5t
h 
St
re
et
C
ontech
I&
E
Jam
es 
T
im
ec
AfinidAd LXVi, 543, Septiembre-Octubre 2009378
Figure 6. Schematic representation of TNT mod-
el results for explosion yields from 1 to 10 % 
and for different overpressure damages.
Figure 7. Schematic representation of TNO Multi-Energy 
model results for different overpressure damages.
Figure 8. Schematic representation of Baker-Strehlow-
Tang model results for different overpressure damages.
Figure 9 compares overpressure values versus distance 
obtained with the three different models used in this work, 
establishing critical distances and the associated dama-
ge.  In this Figure, horizontal lines represent different over-
pressure threshold for certain damage, and the vertical 
line represents the nearest trailer position. When the curve 
predicted by a model is placed right to the intersection 
Baker-Strehlow
TNO MULTI-ENERGY
between the vertical and horizontal lines, it means that this 
damage would be produced at that distance taking into 
account that model. Therefore, death threshold and trai-
ler position plotted in this figure show how TNO and BST 
models predict more than 90% of death at nearest trailer 
distance. Moreover, it is noticeable that at a distance up 
to 125 m there are a total building destructions using  the 
TNO and BST models whereas with the TNT model these 
destructions occurs up to 50 m and using a yield reaction 
of 10 %.
Figure 9. Comparison of the results obtained with dif-
ferent models applied to standard damages.
Despite the differences in the results got with the different 
models, they all are in a similar and reasonably coherent 
order of magnitude. It can be said that what really happe-
ned was an intermediate situation between the predicted 
by the models.
4.3 Effect of thermal radiation
The methodology explained in point 2.3. to calculate Pro-
bit units was applied from 5 to 150 metres.  All the re-
sults are shown in Table 5. As it can be observed, at 45.7 
metres (the distance of the nearest trailer) the probability 
is, theoretically, over 100 %. The 100 % death probability 
threshold is situated at, approximately, up to 90 metres. 
It slightly overestimates what really occurred, but it is de-
finitely in a reasonable order of magnitude. It can be ob-
served, that the 50 % of probability of death is reached at 
distances close to 120 metres what demonstrates that this 
types of accidents are very dangerous.
Table 5. Probability of death by thermal radiation up to 150 m.
x (m) t (s) Fvg IR (kW/m
2) V Y
Death pro-
bability (%)
25 1.48 4.20 1953.4 183326 16.12 100
10050 1.39 1.05 458.8 26568 11.18
75 1.34 0.47 196.6 8583.1 8.29 100
90 1.32 0.32 134.3 5164.1 6.99 98
89100 1.31 0.26 107.8 3850.2 6.24
110 1.30 0.22 88.3 2952.1 5.64 75
115 1.29 0.20 80.5 2608.2 5.24 60
120 1.29 0.18 73.6 2316.5 4.93 48
125 1.28 0.17 67.6 2067.4 4.64 36
130 1.28 0.16 62.3 1853.4 4.36 26
140 1.27 0.13 53.3 1507.6 3.83 12
5150 1.26 0.12 46.2 1243.9 3.34
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Consequence analysis is a powerful tool to reproduce 
damages occurred in a chemical plant accident. Though 
companies develop complex software that requires huge 
computation capacity, simple empirical models, such as 
TNT, TNO or BST can be used with a reasonable degree 
of accuracy, needing much shorter computation times and 
not so powerful equipment to deal with calculations. A 
spreadsheet excel and the Figures are enough to make all 
the calculations.
Evaporated mass calculation is a critical data to deal with 
the rest of predictions. From empirical data, and making 
several simplifications, the value obtained was 4881.9 kg. 
Data obtained vary with the model applied, though all of 
them are within a reasonably narrow range. That suggests 
that the actual damages can be conceived as an interme-
diate situation between those predicted by the models. 
Damages calculated for overpressure increase in the fol-
lowing order:
TNT<TNO<BST
Damages predicted for thermal radiation were also within 
the actual range of fatalities. Although dealing with fatali-
ties is always difficult, due to the domino effect that ac-
companies this kind of accidents, overpressure and ther-
mal radiation obtained by the models used at the distance 
of the nearest trailer match the injuries occurred the day of 
the accident. 
Finally, it can be said that these three simple models are 
useful to carry out the consequence analysis of this type 
of accidents and allow predicting or determining the safety 
zone of chemical industries.
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